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Uncertainty: A Diagrammatic Treatment
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the difference between the mainstream and Keynesian
understandings of uncertainty which persists in spite of superficial similarities. It is argued
that the difference stems from the mainstream habit of thinking in terms of a full-information
benchmark, where uncertainty arises from incomplete information. Degrees of uncertainty
(or ambiguity) refer to the quantifiable extent of incompleteness. In contrast, Keynesian
uncertainty cannot, even in principle, be eliminated. By treating uncertain knowledge as the
norm, Keynesian uncertainty theory analyses differing degrees of uncertainty in relation to
grounds for belief and thus considers the cognitive role of institutions and conventions in
influencing the degree of uncertainty. The paper offers a simple diagrammatic representation
of these differences, and illustrates its use with different depictions of the crisis, its aftermath
and the policy response appropriate to each understanding.
(Published in Special Issue Radical Uncertainty and Its Implications for Economics)
JEL  B41  B5  E00  G01
Keywords  Uncertainty; risk; Keynes
Authors
Sheila Dow,  University of Stirling, United Kingdom, s.c.dow@stir.ac.uk
Citation  Sheila Dow (2016). Uncertainty: A Diagrammatic Treatment. Economics: The Open-Access, Open-
Assessment E-Journal, 10 (2016-3): 1—25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2016-3
 www.economics-ejournal.org  2 
1 Introduction 
Uncertainty rose sharply with the financial crisis, causing a rush for liquidity and a 
collapse in spending plans; recovery from the ensuing economic crisis required a 
restoration of confidence in expectations and some positive animal spirits.  
This statement would probably be supported by a large swathe of economic 
commentators. It sounds like a very Keynesian analysis – so is it the case again 
that ‘we are all Keynesians now’? But the above statement has to be understood in 
terms of what is assumed about expectations more generally (including outside of 
a crisis situation), and ultimately about the nature of the subject matter. When we 
explore this further below we will see that uncertainty in mainstream economics is 
treated as an aberration from the certainty benchmark, with greatest incidence in 
times of crisis. We will explore the very different Keynesian analysis of 
expectations which applies in and out of crisis, without a certainty benchmark, and 
where uncertainty is endogenous to social conventions and institutional 
developments (see further Dow 2013, 2015). Since each approach understands 
uncertainty differently, they each hold different implications, not only for 
theorising, but also for policy addressed to reducing uncertainty. 
The term ‘uncertainty’ itself is used in the literature with a range of meanings 
which in turn reflect different frameworks. 1 In traditional mainstream economic 
and finance theory, uncertainty is conflated with risk, which is in turn measured by 
low (objective or subjective) probability. But here we treat known quantifiable risk 
(including higher-order stochastic structures) as falling within the category of 
certain knowledge and use the term ‘uncertainty’ to apply only to any 
circumstances where quantifiable probabilities are not known, whether knowable 
or not. It will be argued that it is that proviso about knowability which will prove 
to be crucial. Uncertainty about quantitative probabilities, or ambiguity, has been 
an increasing focus of the mainstream analysis of uncertainty in the wake of the 
crisis. But since ambiguity presumes that quantified probabilities are in principle 
knowable, it is a special case of uncertainty. Fundamental uncertainty (or ‘radical’ 
uncertainty) is the outcome of the absence of quantifiable cardinal probabilities, 
which Keynes argued to be the more general case.  
_________________________ 
1 See Dequech (2011) for a typology of different meanings of uncertainty. Sometimes different terms 
have common meaning. This too can be confusing, but our focus here is on different meanings of the 
term ‘uncertainty’.  
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There is a substantial literature on this subject, but it is dense and complex. 
Other notable figures than Keynes, such as von Mises, Hayek and Shackle, have 
also explored uncertainty that in a range of ways differ from the standard 
mainstream account. We focus here on Keynes’s views on fundamental uncer-
tainty as providing a theory of decision-making which is arguably the most 
philosophically-grounded and the most developed, as a counterpoint to the 
mainstream. Further the account here of Keynes’s ideas is itself a simplification, 
since a full account requires a more complex typology (as offered for example by 
Carabelli 1995). But given that the purpose here is to clarify the most important 
differences between fundamental uncertainty and ambiguity (both distinguished 
from risk), some simplification is necessary. 2  
The aim is clarification rather than advocacy of any one approach. We attempt 
to communicate the material in a simple, visual, way in a series of diagrams set out 
below. These diagrams refer to the ‘universe of expectations’ in an economy, i.e. 
the emphasis is on a (simplified) notion of the state of expectations in the 
economy. Where relevant to the analysis we will consider compositional issues; in 
the mainstream approach these refer to the scope for different groupings of 
representative agents with different information sets, and in the Keynesian 
approach primarily to the role of social conventional knowledge within different 
groupings.  
First we consider how uncertainty is understood according to the dualistic 
identification of fundamental uncertainty with ignorance. We then proceed to 
consider non-dualistic ideas on degrees of uncertainty. The differences of approach 
are illustrated further by diagrammatic representations of the run-up to the crisis 
and the situation following the onset of crisis. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications for theory and policy of these different under-
standings.  
_________________________ 
2 Dequech (2000) provides an excellent account of the distinction between these two approaches to 
uncertainty, going into many of the theoretical issues addressed here in greater depth. 
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2 A traditional dualistic understanding of uncertainty 
In the absence of a theory of fundamental uncertainty, traditional mainstream 
analysis generally conflates uncertainty with risk by our definition. While the 
scope for establishing objective measures of risk may be problematic, Savage’s 
(1954) subjective expected utility (SEU) device allows for the general 
establishment of subjective quantitative measurement of probabilities of events 
occurring. 3 In the traditional Bayesian framework, these probabilities apply to a 
(subjectively or objectively) known range of states of the world and expected 
events arising within that range. The universe of expectations is therefore a closed 
system (Chick and Dow 2005) and so fundamental uncertainty has no place in 
such models. In dualistic terms, either knowledge (as information) is certain in that 
it is subject to quantifiable probabilities, i.e. risk, or else it is not, i.e. it is the dual 
of risk. Uncertainty can then only be understood as ignorance. 4 This approach is 
captured in the strong version of rational expectations hypothesis (REH) which 
became embedded in mainstream macroeconomic models, whereby there is shared 
knowledge of the correct model by which to calculate probabilities.  
Nevertheless, in traditional mainstream macroeconomic models, there is still 
scope for uncertainty as an exogenous variable, a source of shock.5 We can show 
this view of knowledge in simplified form in Figure 1, which classifies the 
universe of expectations about events according to whether or not they are subject 
to (quantifiable) risk or uncertainty. Most knowledge is viewed as known (or 
known to be stochastic in some form), shaded white, with a solid boundary to 
indicate presumed knowledge about the range of possible outcomes within the 
known state space. There is in addition scope in non-Bayesian theory for a 
component of the universe of expectations, shaded black, which is outside 
economic theory and therefore falls within the category of uncertainty in the sense  
 
_________________________ 
3 Lucas (1980) justifies such an approach on the grounds that it renders Keynes’s ideas on expec-
tations operational and thus more ‘fruitful’, in the process eliminating a role for uncertainty. 
4 See further Dow (1990) on dualism. 
5 This includes models which address the unknown future by devices such as assuming prices to be 
established on the basis of contingent claims (Lucas 1980: 707). Earlier, Coddington (1982) had 
discussed Keynes’s uncertainty analysis in terms of his need to find an exogenous variable to explain 
instability. 
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Figure 1: Expectations in mainstream economics: dualistic version 
of a shock. But the scope for such uncertainty is very limited, something which is 
reflected in the inattention to uncertainty (as defined here) in the traditional 
mainstream literature. The small black outer area in Figure 1, representing 
uncertainty, is also bounded by a solid line to reflect the heavily circumscribed 
scope for shocks (which are often themselves depicted as emanating from a 
random distribution). The general case is knowledge to which quantitative 
probabilities apply, leaving the absence (if any) of such probabilities as the special 
case, independent of the specified range of states of the world.  
This dualistic view has also been applied to Keynesian uncertainty, but with 
the opposite view as to which is the special case for the universe of expectations: 
risk or uncertainty. Keynes (1921) opened his Treatise on Probability with a 
statement about the generality of uncertainty, whereby knowledge could be treated 
as certain only in very special circumstances (direct knowledge and logically 
necessary propositions). This followed from his understanding of the subject 
matter, particularly of social systems, as being open and organic, limiting the 
scope for demonstrative logic. Subjective probability measurement did not provide 
the same escape from uncertainty as in the mainstream literature. Keynes (1921: 4) 
understood probability in its logical sense as something objective, given evidence 
to which reason is applied. It is also subjective in the sense that each agent draws 
on her own understandings in order to establish grounds for belief, but this by no 
means precludes uncertainty given that these grounds may be weak. Further, 
Keynesian expectations apply to propositions about the possible states of the world 
which generate events, i.e. more widely than the quantified event predictions of 
mainstream theory. 
([1921] 
1973) 
Risk 
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It was understandable how the Keynesian literature could be read in a dualistic 
way from a mainstream perspective, with its focus on certainty and in the absence 
of a theory of uncertainty. Indeed this dualism also characterised much of the 
earlier literature on Keynesian uncertainty (see Dequech 2000: 53). Until the re-
issue of A Treatise on Probability in 1973, the understanding of Keynesian 
uncertainty was heavily influenced by Keynes’s restatement of the argument of 
The General Theory in his 1937 article, where he said with respect to long-term 
expectations: ‘About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know’ (Keynes 1937: 
114).6 For a long time the dualistic reading dominated. 
This dualistic understanding of Keynesian uncertainty can be represented by 
Figure 2, where uncertainty/ignorance is the general case and certain knowledge, 
or risk, only pertains to very particular circumstances. The universe of 
expectations has a dashed outline to reflect the openness of the subject matter to 
the evolution of structure and the effects of creativity. Since these prevent the 
enumeration of all possible events, they account for the general absence of 
quantified probabilities. 
 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Expectations in Keynes: dualistic version 
 
_________________________ 
6 Knight’s (1921) uncertainty is commonly discussed in similar dualistic terms. As with Keynes, 
Knight’s discussion of uncertainty and how to deal with it is more complex than this depiction 
allows; however arguably Knightian uncertainty could fall within what we will discuss below as 
ambiguity.  
Risk 
(
 
 
Uncertainty 
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Understood in these terms, it is not surprising that Coddington (1982) should 
warn of nihilism.7 From a mainstream perspective, whatever is unexplained within 
the formal equilibrium framework represented by the small white area is 
exogenous and thus beyond the scope for economic analysis. To argue that most 
knowledge falls outside that framework, the black area of uncertainty thus 
dominating the white area, is seen as giving up on scientific knowledge. This is 
where the issue of framework is crucial, since a Keynesian framework does in fact 
provide analysis of uncertain knowledge. Uncertainty may be classified as 
ignorance of certain knowledge, but there is much more to be said about it. In what 
follows we consider such possibilities within a non-dualistic framework. Further, 
while it is well-established now that Keynesian uncertainty is a matter of degree, 
are there degrees of uncertainty in the mainstream literature which do not collapse 
into quantifiable stochastic structures?  
3 A non-dualistic understanding of uncertainty 
The dualistic representation of understandings of uncertainty is at odds with the 
modern Keynesian literature, which we will explore below. But it may also be 
regarded as being at odds with the weak form of the REH, whereby there is a 
diversity of views as to which is the (knowable) correct model on which to base 
expectations because of differing, limited information sets. Concerns with 
uncertainty were raised early on in terms of the consequence of missing 
information (see e.g. Jones and Ostroy 1984) and of uncertainty about the true 
structure of the economy, or model uncertainty (see e.g. Hansen and Sargent 
2001).  
But the experience of the crisis itself provided a significant impetus to 
developments in mainstream thinking on uncertainty, in that it posed particular 
challenges to the SEU approach. The freezing of markets during the crisis was 
evidence that there are times when agents are not willing to place bets, i.e. 
unwilling or unable to estimate probabilities. 8 Other phenomena such as 
_________________________ 
7 Postmodernists have also applied this term (in an approving way) to the implications of Keynesian 
uncertainty. See for example Amariglio and Ruccio (1995). 
8 See Runde’s (1995) critique of the SEU approach along these lines. 
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unexplained rises in credit risk spreads also encouraged attention to the possibility 
of uncertainty (Boyarchenko 2012). More generally the crisis encouraged the 
further development of the information-theoretic approach. The source of the crisis 
was seen in institutional impediments to information access (asymmetric 
information) with respect to risk assessment of particular products.  
The effect of the crisis was seen as an exogenous shock to uncertainty itself, 
with consequences driven by uncertainty aversion (which may differ as between 
different cohorts of representative agents). These factors made it more difficult for 
agents to access and process information and then to learn in such a way as to 
converge on correct equilibrium expectations (including learning about each 
other’s behavioural reactions). Indeed the limitations on full information, on the 
capacity to process information and on knowledge of the true structure of the 
economy may even be endemic (see e.g. Stiglitz 2009). Within this increasingly 
influential approach, missing information, and thus less-than-complete confidence 
in expectations, have come to be regarded as the norm. But uncertainty is still 
treated as ignorance of information which can in principle be acquired (see 
Morgan and Sheehan 2014). The assumption is that all possible outcomes can be 
listed; the real economy is such as to yield stochastic structures and these are, in 
principle, knowable. In other words, the subject matter is still understood as a 
closed system. 
Uncertainty has been considered lately in mainstream economics in terms of 
the emergence of ‘unknown unknowns’ in the sense of unimaginable events. 
Feduzi and Runde (2014) question the coherence of such ‘unknowable unknowns’ 
in a Bayesian framework, which requires a known state space. 9 They can only 
make sense as ‘knowable unknowns’, i.e. events which could have been imagined, 
but had been unimagined. Within a mainstream framework, the explanation must 
lie in missing information or cognitive limitations. 
A related discussion of degrees of uncertainty has arisen in the financial risk 
literature, building on Taleb’s (2007) reference to black swans as a metaphor for 
(supposedly) unimagined events with serious consequences like the financial 
crisis. The ‘black swan’ term is a reference to the standard example of unknown 
possibilities used to explain the (statistical) problem of induction as an inability to 
_________________________ 
9 Where an unknown unknown is understood as a low-probability event it falls within the category of 
risk. 
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enumerate all instances within a given range of possibilities. 10  In unpacking 
Taleb’s use of this metaphor, Runde (2009) pinpoints some ambiguities in the way 
that it has been used. For our purposes what is significant is the interpretation that 
the crisis is seen as a black swan event in the sense of a low probability event but 
also an unimagined event, i.e. as falling within the category of uncertainty as 
represented in Figure 1. A grey swan event is only a low-probability event, and so 
falls into our category of risk. However in the financial risk literature a grey swan 
event is sometimes also classified as an event which is less difficult to predict than 
a black swan event, and thus corresponds more closely to a lesser degree of 
uncertainty than a black swan event (see e.g. Mathijs 2012). 
The possibility of degrees of uncertainty has been pursued in the mainstream 
literature, using instead the term ‘ambiguity’, in a way which accords well with 
information theory and which allows scope for discussing a modification of the 
dualistic representation of the mainstream account depicted above. Camerer and 
Weber (1992: 330, emphasis added) define ambiguity as ‘uncertainty about 
probability, created by missing information which is relevant and could be 
known’. 11 They distinguish between expectations which can be subject to higher-
order probabilities from those which cannot. Higher-order quantifiable 
probabilities fall inside our category of risk, while ambiguity which cannot be so 
captured falls into the category of uncertainty. Uncertainty about (even higher-
order) probability distributions is greater the more information is missing. As new 
information emerges, agents may change their probability estimates. But more 
evidence would always be expected to reduce the degree of ambiguity, other things 
being equal. So, even within the mainstream framework where there is one correct 
model (although agents are uncertain as to what it is) and therefore one notion of 
relevance of evidence, and where all possible outcomes have been identified, the 
inability to establish a quantifiable probability (i.e. uncertainty) is subject to a 
quantifiable scale.  
While ambiguity means that there is a lack of confidence in any estimate of a 
single probability or stochastic structure, this can be a matter of degree which can 
_________________________ 
10 This is a more restricted notion of the problem of induction than the Humean notion we discuss 
below as applied by Keynes. 
11 Arguably this corresponds also to Knight’s (1921) understanding of uncertainty. Some of the 
ambiguity literature also refers to cognitive limitations to the absorption of information. 
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be measured. Thus for example Kozeniauskas et al. (2014: 1) are typical in 
identifying different types of uncertainty in quantifiable terms: ‘Macro uncertainty 
is the second moment of the distribution of a macro quantity (here, GDP growth) 
conditional on what an agent knows. Micro and higher-order uncertainty are cross-
sectional variances that measure differences in firms' earnings or forecasts’. 
Higher-order uncertainty corresponds to model uncertainty, with the range of 
forecasts reflecting the extent to which agents are uncertain as to which is the 
correct model: confidence in expectations is thought to be inversely related to the 
degree of dispersion of opinion. Bloom (2009) also considers dispersion of 
economic forecasts as an indicator of model uncertainty, but uses second-order 
stock market volatility in his formal analysis. Boyarchenko (2012) identifies 
missing information (ambiguity about the quality of signals) and model 
uncertainty (ambiguity about the underlying dynamics) by means of different error 
structures.  
But in modelling practice, these indicators of uncertainty can come to 
represent uncertainty itself, endogenising it within a closed system where 
probabilities are quantified by the analyst (Dow 2004). It is therefore important to 
distinguish between uncertainty about quantifying probabilities on the one hand 
and measures of this inability on the other. Within a mainstream rational 
expectations framework, which depicts agents forming expectations in the same 
way as an econometrician, the two become conflated; ambiguity in the model is 
the same as the stochastic indicator of ambiguity, and thus risk. Orlick and 
Veldkamp (2014: Abstract) put it as follows: ‘This paper argues that people do not 
know the true distribution of macroeconomic outcomes. Like Bayesian 
econometricians, they estimate a distribution. Using real-time GDP data, we 
measure uncertainty as the conditional standard deviation of GDP growth, which 
captures uncertainty about the distributions [of] estimated parameters’. 
Much of what is termed ambiguity is therefore in fact covered by risk, the 
white area in Figure 3, while the small black area representing the scope for 
exogenous uncertainty shocks remains. We classify this as ‘fundamental’ 
uncertainty (rather than fundamental uncertainty) because, unlike Keynesian 
fundamental uncertainty, it is known to have a(n unknown) stochastic structure. 
Only outside an REH framework, if agents are not represented as econometricians, 
is there scope for ambiguity which cannot be converted into risk. But the degree of  
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Figure 3: Expectations in mainstream economics: non-dualistic version 
 
this core element of ambiguity which corresponds to uncertainty can be measured 
definitively by the extent of missing information and model uncertainty. We show 
this as a grey area whose boundary is solid, representing the definitive way in 
which the incidence of this type of uncertainty can be measured in the ambiguity 
approach.  
While degrees of uncertainty only gradually emerged in mainstream theory, 
Keynes was clear from the start that he understood uncertainty as a matter of 
degree. He began his Treatise on Probability as follows: 
In most branches of academic logic, such as the theory of the syllogism or the 
geometry of ideal space, all the arguments aim at demonstrative certainty. 
They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational and claim 
some weight without pretending to be certain. In Metaphysics, in Science, and 
in Conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational 
beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus for a 
philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of 
probability is required (Keynes 1921: 2, emphasis added). 
Keynes argued further that the reason for this general inconclusiveness was the 
organic nature of the subject matter, where at any one time the future is yet to 
evolve or be created. For Keynes the subject matter and therefore our knowledge 
about it are open systems, in contrast to the closed system implied by mainstream 
theory (Chick and Dow 2005). While ambiguity theory rests on the assumption 
that full information with respect to one correct model is in principle available 
‘Fundamental’ 
 Uncertainty 
Ambiguity   
Risk 
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(even if in practice access is limited), for Keynes this was inconceivable except 
under very special circumstances. Indeed, within an open system of knowledge, 
the concept of ‘information’ can only refer to a subset of knowledge, such that 
information can never be full enough to justify action. Even fundamentally 
uncertain knowledge can provide justification for action, even if that justification 
proves to have been misguided.  
For Keynes, the problem of induction was the Humean one which referred to 
the impossibility of knowing causal structures, far less the enumeration of all 
instances. At best we can normally only form provisional partial theories by 
applying logic to past experience. Given that we cannot establish universal 
demonstrably-true axioms, classical deductive logic cannot apply and we need to 
rely instead on ‘human’ logic to address the uncertainty surrounding any premises. 
Unlike for ambiguity theory, the norm for Keynes is not quantifiable probability 
but rather, at best, ordinal probability (Carabelli 1995). 
Since there are limited grounds on which to be certain about anything, and yet 
generally we are able to justify action, it is unhelpful to lump all other knowledge 
into the category of ignorance. Indeed Keynes used the term ‘ignorance’ to refer to 
lack of evidence relative to availability of evidence, i.e. it is a matter of degree. 
This discussion arose in the course of his introduction of the term ‘weight of 
evidence’. An expectation and the probability attached to it were more reliable the 
more available was relevant evidence relative to absence of relevant evidence. 
This was independent of whether the probability was high or low. We have noted 
that there is a parallel with the ambiguity literature in that confidence is lower 
(uncertainty and ambiguity higher) the less relevant evidence can be brought to 
bear. Uncertainty is a matter of degree.  
But there are important differences. First, since there is in general no 
possibility of accessing complete evidence, far less conceiving of what full 
evidence might be, Keynesian weight cannot be measured in cardinal terms, but is 
rather an ordinal concept (Dequech 2000: 52). Second, while uncertainty 
inevitably falls with new information in the ambiguity literature, it may rise in the 
Keynesian framework. What is relevant depends on the understanding of how the 
economy works, and new evidence might reveal unrecognised realms of ignorance 
(Runde 1990). Third, there is no benchmark true model or measure of complete 
information, given the openness of the economic system and therefore the 
unknowability of the range of possible outcomes. So judgements as to weight of 
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evidence must be provisional and incomplete, and open to shifts for reasons which 
reflect the interface between emotion and cognition (Dow 1995). There is 
therefore no basis for a cardinal measure of weight of evidence and therefore for 
degree of uncertainty. Even the measure of disparity of expectations cannot be 
used as an indicator of uncertainty, as is the case in the mainstream literature. Each 
set of expectations may be confidently held, while even if all are agreed on an 
expectation there may also be agreement that this expectation is not confidently 
held, i.e. it is subject to a high degree of uncertainty (see Dow et al. 2009).  
The scope for reliable knowledge varies according to circumstances. For 
example, even although cardinal comparisons between probabilities are not in 
general possible, ordinal comparisons may be possible, as a guide to action. Thus 
for example, insurance companies can use actuarial tables as an imperfect, but 
serviceable, guide to quoting premiums, since the structure of actuarial risk tends 
to be quite stable. (The wealth of historical data means that weight of evidence is 
relatively high.) Even for one-off risks, reasonable ranges of risk can be estimated, 
as in the ambiguity literature, near the top of which a premium may fall. As 
Keynes (1921: 176) put it: ‘Many probabilities, which are incapable of numerical 
measurement, can be placed nevertheless between numerical limits. And by taking 
particular non-numerical probabilities as standards a great number of comparisons 
or approximate measurements become possible.’ But, while in ambiguity theory 
one of the range of possible non-additive probability distributions is correct, for 
Keynes the general case is that there is no reliable numerical probability 
distribution to be discovered.12  
But in most circumstances there is less scope for reliable knowledge. Human 
logic employs strands of reasoning which are not necessarily commensurate 
(allowing collapse into a probability calculation), such that different pieces of 
evidence and different reasons may conflict. Even more challenging are 
circumstances where reason and evidence are lacking. Where there is thus no basis 
for decision-making, the sensible option is inaction, as in the exercise of liquidity 
preference. The difficulty of making judgements about probability apply 
particularly to the long term. It was the scantiness of knowledge about the very 
_________________________ 
12 Keynes’s (1921) early analysis of uncertainty included analysis of what came to be termed 
ambiguity as a special case. 
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long term which prompted Keynes’s (1937: 114) statement ‘We simply do not 
know’, a case where (even partial) reasons and evidence are lacking.  
From a mainstream perspective such an epistemology may seem to verge on 
nihilism. But the fact is that decisions are generally taken, in spite of pervasive 
uncertainty, demonstrating the prevalence of practical rules which are used to 
guide decisions, as explained for example in Keynes (1937).13 Keynes argued that 
it is conventional to give more credence to extrapolation from past trends than we 
know is reliable. It may therefore be conventional, under fundamental uncertainty, 
to act as if there was a preferred model and a relevant set of information (and thus 
the scope to measure risk), with uncertainty relevant only in the sense of 
ambiguity. But since the underlying subject matter does not yield correct models 
or notions of completeness of information, this convention is vulnerable to being 
confounded by actual developments. What supports such conventions in the face 
of contrary evidence, and what then accounts for new evidence prompting a 
recognition of low weight of evidence is substantially a matter of psychology 
which for Keynes was integral to epistemology (Dow 2011). Social psychology is 
particularly relevant, given that judgements as to the uncertainty of knowledge will 
reflect conventional judgements among peers; different groups in society will 
apply different judgements.  
The scope for instability implied by this epistemology is moderated, not only 
by conventions, but also by institutions which perform a cognitive role (Dequech 
2000). Indeed, considered over the evolution of society, some institutions have 
evolved precisely to provide a grounding for decision-making under uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is thus endogenous (Dow 2014). The kind of institutional 
arrangements which are identified as the source of missing information in the 
mainstream approach (such as administered prices, or central bank support for 
banks facing liquidity problems) can provide a stable environment which reduces  
uncertainty (just as Coase, 1937, analysed institutional structure at the firm level as 
a mechanism for dealing with uncertainty).14 
_________________________ 
13 A subsequent large literature has developed, particularly in the management field, on conventions 
to support decision-making under uncertainty (Feduzi and Runde 2014). 
14 See also McKenna and Zannoni (2001), who pursue this tack in direct response to Coddington’s, 
1982, charge of nihilism and Dow and Dow (2011), who explore the way in which animal spirits can 
be molded by institutions and conventions. 
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Figure 4: Expectations in Keynes: non-dualistic version 
 
Figure 4 is an attempt at depicting this non-dualistic version of Keynesian 
uncertainty. Again only a very small proportion of expectations can be based on 
anything approaching certainty, shaded white. Now we also include an area where 
it is conventional to treat the subject matter as if arising from a closed system, such 
that uncertainty is regarded as ambiguity, even though it is in fact subject to 
fundamental uncertainty (so it is labelled ‘ambiguity’ rather than ambiguity). But, 
otherwise, uncertain expectations are shown as varying in degree of reliability, 
where there is no expectation of arriving at a ‘correct’ model or a complete set of 
information. But, while weight of evidence plays a part in determining the degree 
of uncertainty, it is conditional on notions of relevance with respect to an 
understanding of the economy for which there is no benchmark in the form of a 
correct model. At any one time there will simultaneously be more or less 
confidence in different types of decisions, represented by the different shading. 
This contrasts with the layer of ambiguity in Figure 3 whose quantifiability renders 
it homogeneous. 
In fact uncertainty in a Keynesian framework is multidimensional, so that 
Figure 4 can only be indicative of a much more complex and evolving structure of 
expectations. Each band has a hatched outline to represent the openness of 
judgement and the scope for discrete shifts, given the absence of any benchmark 
for ‘complete information’; it also reflects the fact that fundamental uncertainty 
applies to (at best) ordinal rather than cardinal probabilities and reflects ordinal 
rather than cardinal notions of weight. Among the incommensurate contributors to 
weight are conventional judgements.  
Degrees of 
Fundamental  
Uncertainty 
‘Ambiguity’ 
Risk 
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4 Risk, uncertainty and the crisis  
We can use the crisis as a case study by which to understand the significance of 
the difference between these two non-dualistic approaches to uncertainty. We 
consider how we might represent the two approaches in the run-up to the crisis, 
and then as the crisis hits. 
The general case within an ambiguity framework is a stable incidence of 
missing information, the outcome often of institutional constraints. But the run-up 
to the financial crisis poses a problem in determining whether ambiguity due to 
missing information rose or fell. The explanation for the crisis from an 
information-theoretic point of view is that information was concealed, leading to 
the mis-pricing of risk. This was due to the institutional structure, including such 
factors as opaque structured products and active concealment of information by 
credit-rating agencies. But while this would imply increasing levels of ambiguity 
as the crisis approached, that is not what is picked up by the measurement of 
ambiguity by second-order volatility. Rather what is shown is that uncertainty was 
relatively stable before the crisis, but then spiked at the onset of crisis, acting as a 
shock to confidence in expectations. The appreciation that information was 
missing only occurred ex post.15 So we must represent ambiguity with this source 
as being low. 
This would be consistent with the view that model uncertainty was judged to 
be low in this period. It was the last stage of the Great Moderation, a period of 
stable rising asset prices and confidence in financial markets to manage risk. 
Macroeconomic policy (including its key component, monetary policy) was 
consensual. Given the prior position that there is one best macroeconomic model, 
combined with the advances in robust control theory, there was confidence that the 
tools were available to settle any differences on which was the best model. We 
represent this position in Figure 5 by a smaller component of ambiguity than the 
general case in Figure 3. 
  
_________________________ 
15 It is in fact hard to sustain this argument within a rational choice model; agents freely bought 
structured products whose risk-profile was unknowable. 
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Figure 5: Expectations in the run-up to the crisis: mainstream economics 
 
But with the onset of crisis, awareness of uncertainty escalated, something 
which has been documented in the econometric studies of ambiguity (see e.g. 
Bloom 2009 and Boyarchenko 2012). First there was the event of the crisis itself 
being treated as an exogenous shock from within the black area of uncertainty – an 
‘unknowable unknown’. This shock increased awareness of the potential extent of 
ignorance, shown by an enlarged grey area: a higher degree of ambiguity (Figure 6).  
There was increased awareness of the flimsy information basis for the 
valuation of many assets; it is at times of crisis that agents are most likely to feel 
the absence of correct information. Further the evident shortcomings of 
macroeconomic models in the face of the crisis spawned activity in formulating 
new macroeconomic models to capture the new environment, the assumption 
continuing to be that there would be one best model (Lawson 2009). In the 
meantime, model uncertainty could be said to have increased. But the increase in 
uncertainty has been identified empirically as a spike in volatility which was short-
lived. As time passed after the crisis, institutional adjustments designed to increase 
transparency and an improved understanding of the structure of the economy are 
both expected to reduce the area of ambiguity to the norm depicted in Figure 3. 
The implication is that, if attention to transparency of information is sustained 
(alongside reduction in state-led distortions to incentives), crises are avoidable. 
The Keynesian analysis of the run-up to the crisis, drawing on Minsky (1986), 
has emphasised the euphoric state of expectations encouraged by the stable rise in 
asset prices. The expanded capacity to increase leverage in order to make further 
capital gains was facilitated by the deregulation of the financial sector. Because 
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Figure 6: Expectations at the onset of crisis: mainstream economics 
 
this process in fact increased the fragility of the financial sector, increasing the risk 
of a crisis, the weight attached to the evidence of continuing gains was not 
reasonable. But, as Minsky had argued, stability breeds instability by encouraging 
an unreasonable increase in confidence in expectations. There was a presumption 
that markets were pricing risk effectively with the aid of mathematical models 
while in fact assets were being priced according to a dominant market convention 
which seriously understated the underlying fragility. There was a general 
inattention to uncertainty. 
This is represented in Figure 7 by an enlarged white area of expectations for 
which it was thought that most risk was quantifiable, and an enlarged area of 
ambiguity reflecting the widely-held conventional view that the information and 
modelling capacity were within reach for making judgements on quantification of 
other risks. There was uncertainty of differing degrees, reflecting different degrees 
of reliability of expectations in different circumstances, particularly outside 
financial markets, but of very limited extent compared to the areas of presumed 
certainty and ambiguity. 
But the emergence of subprime mortgage defaults and the knock-on falls in 
wider classes of assets from 2007 forced a reassessment of asset pricing as the 
extent of investor ignorance was revealed (a lower weight of argument than had 
been thought). The possibility of default by financial institutions in particular 
challenged conventional trust in bank liabilities and thus in the payment system, 
something which had provided an institutional defense against fundamental 
uncertainty. The crisis was not seen as an exogenous shock, but rather in 
Minskyan terms as the inevitable outcome of the ever-increasing fragility of the 
  
‘Fundamental’ 
Uncertainty 
Ambiguity   
Risk 
 
 www.economics-ejournal.org  19 
 
   
 
                
 
 
 
Figure 7: Keynesian expectations in the run-up to the crisis 
 
financial system in the preceding period of apparent stability. As Runde (2009) 
points out, the crisis was not an ‘unknown unknown’ for Keynesian scholars, or 
indeed for Taleb himself, but rather the logical consequence of increased 
leveraging which had been spurred on by inattention to uncertainty, but without 
any countervailing efforts from the authorities. Nevertheless the timing of the 
crisis and the particular event which would reveal the extent to which pricing had 
been based on over-confidence were both subject to fundamental uncertainty. The 
resulting marked rise in fundamental uncertainty, illustrated in Figure 8, prompted 
the freezing of markets and a general unwillingness to commit to lending and 
spending plans.  
But, while the mainstream approach presumes a return to the normal 
configuration of Figure 3, the Keynesian approach cannot presume a return to 
Figure 4. Expectations and the confidence held in them are founded on conven- 
 
 
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Keynesian expectations at the onset of crisis 
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tional judgement and institutional arrangements alongside reason, evidence and 
sentiment. But the crisis itself has had an irreversible effect on both conventions 
and institutions. Market players have returned to earlier levels of activity, adapting 
conventions to the new environment, and mainstream economists express 
confidence in models refined to allow for the crisis, implying a return to former 
patterns. But in the real economy governments continue to adjust the regulatory 
framework for financial institutions in a not-altogether-convincing attempt to 
reduce public anxiety about the reliability of a range of assets, particularly the 
formerly-safe assets of government debt and bank deposits. Banks continue to 
display a high degree of liquidity preference, at the cost of limited availability of 
credit, particularly for small and medium-sized business. Fundamental uncertainty 
remains relatively high. 
5 Implications 
So what can we take from these different perspectives on expectations and the 
crisis? If we return to the opening statement, both approaches highlight the marked 
increase in uncertainty with the crisis and its real economic consequences. Thus 
for example, from an ambiguity perspective, Faigelbaum et al. (2014) argue that 
higher uncertainty can discourage investment and that uncertainty shocks cause 
real instability. This seems to echo the Keynesian (1987) argument that financial 
instability causes increased liquidity preference and reduced expenditure plans 
when the crisis hits.  
But because these stances arise from very different perspectives, the policy 
implications are also very different. From a mainstream perspective, the key is to 
limit the extent of missing information by promoting greater transparency. This is 
to be achieved by altering incentives to acquire information, e.g. by reducing 
moral hazard through replacing bailing-out with bailing-in. The emphasis has in 
fact been on increased transparency on the part of the state, in terms of monetary 
policy analysis and the treatment of vulnerable financial institutions for example. 
A major focus of uncertainty (identified for example in Boyarchenko’s, 2012, 
analysis) was whether or not too-big-to-fail would apply. As Morgan and Sheehan 
(2014) argue, the outcome has been ‘thin’ institutional solutions to deal with future 
crises. The absence of more radical solutions follows from the mainstream 
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understanding of stability as the norm ensured by freely operating markets and the 
identification of increased uncertainty with shocks.  
But from a Keynesian perspective transparency and the removal of state 
support for the monetary system may in fact be highly damaging. This has been 
discussed particularly with respect to the conduct of monetary policy (see Dow et 
al. 2007). Further, in terms of central bank relations with banks, there was a 
notable difference between the experience of the 1980s debt crisis and the crisis 
which began in 2007. In the former case, the liquidity problems of UK banks were 
dealt with in private while the very public airing of the banks’ problems from 2007 
seriously worsened their positions (eroding confidence) and increased the need for 
bail-outs. A change in regulation is required to allow practices which sustain 
confidence in expectations.  
From a Keynes/Minsky perspective, instability is the norm and the incidence 
of crisis cannot be prevented, because of the nature of financial markets. Given 
fundamental uncertainty, there are no true prices to act as benchmarks, to which 
markets can return after a crisis. Yet conventional judgements build up, often in 
defiance of reason and evidence, which fuel instability. The first focus of policy 
form this perspective therefore has to be vigilance in monitoring financial markets 
for signs both of unreasonable confidence in expectations and increasing fragility 
(Dow 2012). The focus of policy addressed to moderating any tendency for 
increasing uncertainty would involve promoting stability through appropriate 
design of practices, conventions and institutions.  
It is urgent that policy address the potential for uncertainty to aggravate 
continuing instability. But it is important for policy-makers to understand how 
differently such a statement is understood from different perspectives. Until the 
different ways of analysing uncertainty are acknowledged and understood, the 
policy discourse will continue to be mired in confusion. 
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